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Abstract 
We contribute to the value relevance literature by investigating critical methodological deficiencies 
emerged in past and current empirical research. Using Monte Carlo simulations calibrated on the basis 
of the statistical properties of market and accounting data for a large sample of European listed 
companies, we are the first to document and quantify the effects of neglecting the lag of stock price as 
an explanatory variable in the conventional approach for estimating price level regressions. We 
demonstrate that for European listed companies this is an important source of omitted variable bias 
and the extent of such bias increases as the autocorrelation coefficient for stock price and the 
explanatory variables increases. We show that using alternative specifications which deflate the 
accounting variables by the lag of stock price, commonly employed in the accounting literature, can 
lead to high over-rejection rates. Our findings are relevant for the interpretation of most of the 
empirical studies on the impact of IFRS on value relevance in Europe.  
    Keywords: Value relevance; Linear Information Model; IFRS; Monte Carlo simulations; Price 
Regression Mode; Panel data models 
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“The last rule was to make enumerations so complete, and reviews so comprehensive, that I should 
be certain of omitting nothing.”  
René Descartes, Discourse on Method (1637) 
1. Introduction 
In this study we critically address key econometric deficiencies that arise in value relevance 
studies because of a lack of understanding of the process generating the variables in value relevance 
models.  
Value relevance studies aim to assess the extent to which accounting data reflect information that 
is “relevant” for firm value as represented by the stock price. Over the last decades, the literature has 
honed in on a broad range of types of accounting information. Examples include accounting for 
investment securities, goodwill and fair value (Holthausen and Watts, 2001). 
There are two main approaches to measure value relevance (Hellström, 2006): studies based on 
the ‘signalling perspective’ focus on changes in market-based variables following announcements 
related to the release of accounting information; on the other hand, studies focussing on the 
‘measurement perspective’ are based on regression models where the regressand is a stock market 
variable (stock price or return) while the regressors are accounting variables such as book value of 
equity, earnings, and changes in earnings. In this study, we focus on the latter perspective. 
Following the seminal works by Ohlson (1995) and Feltham and Ohlson (1995), most empirical 
studies rely on modified versions of the Linear Information Model (LIM), which models firm value as 
a function of book value of equity and expected future abnormal earnings (Collins et al., 1997; 
Aboody et al., 2002). The LIM is based on the assumption of clean surplus accounting, implying that 
the current book value of equity is equal to the book value of equity from the previous year plus 
current earnings, net of dividends and share repurchases/offerings. The LIM has been hailed as 
“among the most important developments in capital markets research” Bernard (1995, p. 733): its 
main innovation is the departure from classical valuation models based on dividends
1
 – the LIM 
provides a direct link between accounting figures reported in financial statements and firm value. 
Researchers employ the R-squared of regressions developed from the LIM as a measure of value 
relevance: the higher the R-squared, the higher the value relevance. However, this procedure has 
several limitations: in particular, scale effects can give rise to inflated R-squared values in regressions 
                                                             
1 For a comparison between valuation models based on dividends and Ohlson-Feltham models, see Dechow et 
al. (1999). 
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where the stock price is the dependent variable (Easton, 1998; Brown et al., 1999).
2
 On the other 
hand, using stock returns as regressand can lead to R-squared values that are too low (Lev, 1989).  
A common approach for dealing with scale effects in panel data is to deflate all variables by a 
common factor (for example, the lag of stock price, as in Lang et al., 2006). This procedure is 
supposed to allow for heteroskedasticity, which can result in wrong R-squared  values and biased t-
statistics for the individual coefficients (Barth and Clinch, 2009). However, the literature is mixed 
with regard to what variable should be chosen as deflator (Dedman et al., 2009).  
Importantly, as pointed out by Bhargava (2010), combining variables into ratios can result in 
wrong inferences, and this problem is exacerbated in panel data because the stochastic properties of 
the two variables comprising the ratio may evolve differently over time. Moreover, this method does 
not eliminate firm-level time-invariant components of the error term which may, in certain cases, lead 
to inconsistency of the coefficient estimates (Devalle et al., 2010). 
3
  
Table 1 reports value relevance studies which employ price-level regressions, also known as the 
Price Regression Model (PRM).
4
 Among these papers, only Devalle et al. (2010) and Agostino et al. 
(2011) make use of panel data models. 
    [Insert Table 1 Here] 
In this paper, we focus on the impact of unsuitable econometric specifications on the coefficient 
estimates of price level regressions and related specifications that use the lag of stock price as a 
deflator. The validity of the coefficient estimates of price level regressions is a key topic in the value 
relevance literature. For example, Kothari and Zimmerman (1995) assess the extent to which price 
level regressions fit the theoretical prediction of a random walk in earnings. Barth and Kallapur 
(1996) show that deflating the variables by a scale proxy does not usually solve the problem of 
coefficient bias due to an omitted scale proxy (and in certain cases may worsen the problem), while 
including a scale proxy as an explanatory variable mitigates coefficient bias. Relatedly, Aboody et al. 
(2002) investigate the impact of market inefficiency on the coefficient estimates of price level 
                                                             
2 This limitation is particularly troublesome for researchers wishing to compare the explanatory power of the 
model in two or more sub-samples. This may occur, for instance, when investigating value relevance across 
countries, or in studies about the effects of a new regulation on value relevance, which requires estimation of the 
R-squared in the pre-reform and post-reform period. 
3 This problem can be addressed by including firm fixed-effects in the regressions. Much of the value relevance 
literature does not consider firm fixed-effects, although some studies include country and industry fixed-effects 
(for instance, Barth et al., 2014). 
4
 In this list, we consider papers published over the period 2000-2014 in the following major accounting 
journals: Australian Accounting Review; European Accounting Review; Journal of Accounting and Economics; 
Journal of Accounting Research; Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance; Journal of Business Finance & 
Accounting; Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation; Journal of International Financial 
Management & Accounting; Review of Accounting Studies; Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting. 
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regressions. Importantly, none of these papers focus on coefficient bias resulting from autocorrelation 
of the variables in the PRM. We demonstrate that for studies on European listed firms this source of 
bias is very likely to be a serious concern, and we show that it can also be easily allowed for by using 
dynamic panel data models. While these models are often employed in the corporate finance 
literature, they have, to the best of our knowledge, never been employed in the value relevance 
literature.  
Clearly, questioning the validity of the coefficient estimates of price level regressions is of 
paramount importance to make sense of the findings of the empirical literature, and in certain cases 
bears important implications for policy. This is the case for recent empirical papers that attempt to 
evaluate the impact of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) on value relevance 
focusing on the coefficient estimates of the book value per share and earnings per share (Gjerde et al., 
2008; Devalle et al., 2010). Therefore, an investigation of the validity of the coefficient estimates is 
essential to evaluate the validity of the policy recommendations of these papers (Holthausen and 
Watts, 2001). Our study is motivated by recent concerns in both the academia and professional bodies 
about the lack of consistency in the methodology employed in the value relevance literature, 
especially for studies on the implementation of IFRS, which in turn undermines the comparability of 
the findings for different countries (Veith and Werner, 2014; ICAEW, 2014). 
Our analysis of the empirical statistical properties of stock prices, book values of equity per share, 
and earnings per share for a large sample of European companies documents that these variables are 
very likely to follow an autoregressive process. Because of such autocorrelation, any correlation 
between the current value of stock price and the current value of one of the explanatory variables 
spills over to the lag of stock price. Thus, omitting the lag of the stock price from price level 
regressions will lead to omitted variable bias (OVB) if there is a strong autocorrelation in stock price 
and correlation between stock price and any explanatory variable. While this problem may not affect 
the explanatory power of the model and the rejection rate for the null hypotheses that the coefficients 
on book value of equity per share (BVPS) and earnings per share (EPS) are different from zero, it 
clearly undermines the ability of the PRM to capture the true relationship between accounting figures 
and the market value of the firm. The standard PRM is not the only model affected by an 
autoregressive stock price. Even modifications of the PRM that use the lag of stock price as a 
common deflator may be misspecified and lead to wrong inferences.  
We offer four important contributions to the literature. First, we show that the empirical 
autocorrelation function for both the dependent and the independent variables of the PRM exhibits a 
strongly significant and positive first-order autocorrelation coefficient and there is also a significant 
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correlation between the lag of stock price and the explanatory variables.
5
 The combination of these 
two features can lead to OVB if the lag of stock price is not included in the regressions.  
Second, we show that estimating the PRM using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with clustered 
standard errors and omitting the lag of stock price from the regression (the most common approach in 
empirical accounting studies) results in an economically significant bias of the coefficients of the 
explanatory variables which are correlated with the current stock price. The bias persists when firm-
fixed effects are added to the specification. Adding the lag of stock price to the specifications helps 
reduce the bias in the coefficients of the explanatory variables correlated with the lag of price. 
However, in this case, one must use a dynamic panel data model to allow for the “dynamic panel 
bias” (Nickell, 1981).  
Third, we show that modifications of the standard PRM based on the lag of stock price as a 
common deflator may result in invalid t-statistics if the process generating the variables in the model 
is autoregressive. In particular, these models tend to reject of the null hypothesis of no correlation 
between market data and accounting data too often when the null hypothesis is true. 
Finally, while we are aware of the large bulk of literature on the consequences of scale effects on 
rejection rates and coefficient bias calibrated using data from Compustat for US firms, this is to the 
best of our knowledge the first study of this kind on a large sample of European listed firms.  
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 explains the theory and estimation of 
value relevance models based on the LIM. Section 3 examines the autocorrelation properties of the 
variables of the PRM for a sample of European listed firms. Section 4 reports the results of Monte 
Carlo simulations. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
2. Value relevance models: theory and application 
2.1 The Ohlson (1995) and Feltham and Ohlson (1995) approach 
The starting point of value relevance studies based on the “measurement” approach is the LIM 
(Ohlson, 1995; Feltham and Ohlson, 1995), which relates the market value of equity to the book value 
of equity and the present value of abnormal earnings:  
 




1

 a
tttt xERBV         (1) 
                                                             
5 In this paper, we employ the terms “autocorrelation” and “serial correlation” interchangeably.   
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where V is the market value of equity, B is the book value of equity, t is the current period while τ 
denotes the number of periods from period t (so that t + τ is a future period and t – τ is a past period), 
R is (1 + r), where r is the one-period interest rate, E[.] is the expectations operator, and 
1 tt
a
t rBxx denotes abnormal earnings (actual earnings for period t, xt, minus “normal” earnings, 
rBt-1). The only assumption required for (1) to hold is the clean surplus relation: 
ttttt SDxBB  1          (2) 
where D denotes dividends and S share repurchases (the latter can be negative in case of share 
offerings). However, the LIM also involves a prediction on how future abnormal earnings are related 
to current abnormal earnings: 
1,21
1,11




ttt
tmt
a
t
a
t
vv
vxx


        (3) 
where v represents information incorporated in the market value of equity other than the 
information captured by book value of equity and earnings, and m ≥ 0,  0 ≤ ω ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 are 
persistence parameters. Clearly, the autoregressive nature of both B and x
a
 as described by (2) and (3) 
has an impact on V.  
For convenience, consider the case for which   0att xE   for τ > 1, and assume E[ε1,t+1] = 
E[ε2,t+1] = 0, with m = 0 (Ohlson, 1995). Combining (1)-(3), we obtain:  
       
       4323221111
32
2
211
1







tttttttt
tttttttt
rBxrBxrBxRBV
rBxrBxrBxRBV


 (4)  
Therefore, V depends on the current and past values of B and x, which are both autoregressive 
processes, leading to correlation between Vt and Vt–1, as long as 0 < ω ≤ 1 and 0 < γ ≤ 1. In particular, 
both Vt and V t–1 depend, in this case, on xt–1, xt–2, Bt–1, Bt–2, Bt–3. If we assume absence of persistence in 
v, (4) boils down to:  
  
  21
1
11
1
1







tttt
tttt
rBxRBV
rBxRBV


       (5) 
In this case, as long as 0 < ω ≤ 1, both Vt and V t–1 depend on Bt–1. On the other hand, relaxing the 
assumption   0att xE   for τ > 1 leads to an even stronger persistence in V, all other things being 
equal. 
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In Figure 1 we show how the autocorrelation coefficients for the book value of equity and the 
market value of equity changes with ω, if Vt follows an Ohlson-type process based on equations (1)-
(3). The simulations are based on fictitious data on 500 firms and 40 years, considering 0.01 ≤ ω ≤ 1.6 
In particular, we assume a relatively moderate growth in the economy, with an initial interest rate of 
3% which follows a random walk. In Figure 2 we show the same graph assuming an initial rate of 
12%. The graphs clearly show an autocorrelation coefficient very close to one, regardless of the value 
for ω. Therefore, if the market value of equity and book value of equity of firms follow an Ohlson-
type of process, we can expect a very strong autocorrelation component in the stock price and book 
value of equity per share, and potentially even non-stationarity. For high values of ω even the 
earnings per share will have an autocorrelation coefficient close to one. 
    [Insert Figures 1 and 2 Here] 
 
2.2 Estimating the coefficients of the PRM 
Typically, the PRM involves estimating a regression of stock price on book value and earnings 
(net income) per share (Barth et al., 2008).
7
 We consider two possible models for estimating the PRM: 
Pit = a + bBVPSit + cEPSit + eit       (6) 
Pit = a + ρPit–1 + bBVPSit + cEPSit + eit      (7) 
where i = 1, 2, …, N represent firms, t = 1, 2, …, T represent years, and |ρ| < 1.  
The literature has so far considered only model (6) and related modifications. We focus on this 
model because it is less likely to be prone to scale effects than models based on the market value of 
equity, book value of equity, and earnings. One can estimate model (6) using a pooled OLS 
regression, with Huber/White standard errors clustered on the firm level to allow for intra-group 
correlation in the error term.
8
 However, model (6) can also be estimated using a Random Effect (RE) 
model, or a Within-Group (WG) regression, similar to Devalle et al. (2010). These models assume 
that the error term eit comprises a time-invariant firm-specific component (the firm fixed-effect), ηi ~ 
N(η, 
2
 ), and an idiosyncratic component, φit ~ N(0, 
2
 ). The RE model assumes that ηi are 
distributed randomly across firms, and is consistent as long as Cov(ηi, xit) = 0 where xit represent any 
                                                             
6
 More details on the values employed to calibrate the simulations are given in the appendix.  
7 Some studies also use market value of equity, book value of equity, and earnings, rather than the per share 
figures, and in certain cases the variables are adjusted for scale effects through a common deflator. For a good 
explanation of the consequences of using different specifications and deflators, see Barth and Clinch (2009). 
8 This can be implemented in STATA using the command “reg depvar indepvar, cluster(id) robust”. 
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of the explanatory variables in (6). The latter treats ηi as a nuisance parameter and eliminates it by 
subtracting the firm-level mean of each variable for all observations. In so doing, the WG model 
eliminates any firm-specific time-invariant omitted variable which may be correlated with any of the 
explanatory variables. For this reason, the WG model can be applied even in cases for which the 
condition Cov(ηi, xit) = 0 is violated.
9
  
We also estimate (7) using WG to explore the extent to which neglecting the autoregressive nature 
of P can lead to OVB. Therefore, in the case of (6) and (7), the estimated regressions are, 
respectively: 
    iitiiiitiitiit EPSEPScBVPSBVPSbPP     (8) 
     
iitii
iitiitiitiit EPSEPScBVPSBVPSbPPPP



 1
   (9) 
where iiii EPSBVPSP  and  , , are the firm-level averages for P, BVPS, EPS, and φ.  Clearly, the 
demeaning process of WG estimator eliminates ηi and allows for the influence of any omitted time-
invariant variable.
10
 Therefore, estimating (6) according to (8) should lead to unbiased and consistent 
estimates as long as the OVB is due solely to violation of the condition Cov(ηi, xit) = 0.
11
  
Estimating (7) according to (9) results in Cov(
*
it ,
*
it-P 1 ) ≠ 0, where iitit  
*
 and 
iitit PPP   1
*
1  (Nickell, 1981).
 12
 This OVB problem generates from the negative correlation 
between  111 ......
1
1
 

 iTitiit PPP
T
P  and  iTitiit
T
 ......
1
1
2 

  which, as 
described in Bond (2002), does not vanish as the sample increases, leading to a downward bias (and 
inconsistency) for the WG estimate of ρ.13 This problem is commonly known as “dynamic panel bias” 
(Nickell, 1981). 
To address this OVB problem, one can employ a method developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) 
based on Generalised Method of Moments (GMM). This method eliminates ηi by first-differencing 
                                                             
9 An example of such omitted variables may be firm size, leading to well-known scale effects (Barth and 
Grinch, 2009). 
10 A less parsimonious alternative would be to employ a Least Squares Dummy Variables (LSDV) approach, 
which allows for firm fixed-effects by a series of firm dummies. 
11 In conjunction with the WG estimator (implemented in the software package STATA by the command “xtreg 
depvar indepvars, fe”), the option “robust” produces a consistent variance matrix estimator of the errors by 
allowing for non-identically distributed errors across firms (because of, for example, size-induced scale effects) 
or firm-level serial correlation in the errors of fixed order (Stock and Watson, 2008). 
12 The discussion in this section borrows heavily from Roodman (2006) and Bond (2002). 
13 Conversely, the estimate of ρ using OLS will be upward biased. 
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the data, and allows for Cov(
*
it ,
*
it-P 1 ) ≠ 0 via an Instrumental Variables (IV) approach: the lags of 
dependent variable (in levels) are used as instruments for the first-differenced lag of the dependent 
variable. First-differencing has an important advantage as compared to the within-group 
transformation: the transformation affects only the first lag of the error term instead of all of them. For 
this reason, as long as the disturbances, it , are uncorrelated,
14
 one can obtain consistent estimates of 
ρ by using instruments that are correlated with ΔPit–1 = Pit–1 – Pit–2 and uncorrelated with it . For 
instance, Pit–2 can be employed as instruments for ΔPit–1, because it satisfies both an exclusion 
condition,   0E 2  ititP  ,  and a relevance condition,   0E 12   itit PP . To increase the efficiency 
of the estimator, Arellano and Bond (1991) suggest that even further lags (Pit–3,Pit–4, and so on, until 
PiT–2) be used in the estimation. 
The Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator is commonly known as Difference GMM (GMM-DIF), 
because it is based on first-differenced regressions. Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond 
(1998) improve the GMM-DIF estimator by including a system of first-differenced and levels 
equations, where lags of levels (in the former) and lags of the first-differences (in the latter) are 
employed as instruments. When ρ is large, as it is likely to be the case when estimating (7) (see 
Section 3), the performance of the GMM-DIF estimator tends to be poor, because the lagged levels of 
Pit-1 are weak instruments for ΔPit-1 (Blundell and Bond, 1998; Roodman, 2006).
15
 In the appendix we 
report further details regarding the instruments employed by GMM-DIF and GMM-SYS.  
2.3 Alternative specifications 
Some authors have employed alternative specifications to the classical PRM. In this section, we 
examine the impact of autocorrelation in stock price, earnings, and book values on estimation of these 
models.  
A common approach is to focus on stock returns, instead of stock prices. This model is known as 
Return Regression Model (RRM), and is generally based on a regression of stock returns on earnings 
per share and changes in earnings per share: 
itititititit ePEPScPbEPSaRET   11 //      (10) 
                                                             
14 Note that this assumption implies absence of AR(2)-type correlation for the disturbances in the regression in 
first-differences, it . However, AR(1) correlation in it does not invalidate the assumptions of the model. 
15 The System GMM (GMM-SYS) can be implemented in STATA with the user-written command “xtabond2”, 
or with the built-in command “xtdpdsys”. We prefer the former because its flexibility facilitates the comparison 
of the performance of the WG estimator with that of the GMM-SYS estimator in conditions of autoregressive 
variables. In particular, we will employ the two-step version of this estimator, with the standard errors corrected 
using Windmeijer (2005) finite-sample adjustment, to estimate model (7). For more information on how to 
implement the command “xtabond2” in STATA, see Roodman (2006).  
10 
 
where 
1
1


it
ititit
it
P
PDPSP
RET and ΔEPSit = EPSit – EPSit–1 (Barth and Clinch, 2009).  
An alternative specification to the original PRM involves deflating every variable by the lag of 
stock price. This class of adjustment should allow for scale effects:
16
 
ititititititit ePcEPSPbBVPSaPP   111 ///      (11) 
3. Statistical properties of actual market and accounting data 
3.1 Sample construction 
To empirically examine the statistical properties of actual financial data used in the PRM, we 
collect data for a large sample of European listed companies from Amadeus for 17 European 
countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. 
We choose these countries because most of the recent value relevance studies have focused on 
Western Europe, especially to assess the impact of the mandatory adoption of IFRS on value 
relevance. In particular, our sample comprises the same countries used in a recent study by Barth et al. 
(2014), plus Austria and Luxembourg. The cross-country nature of our sample enables us test the 
robustness of our analysis across different institutional, regulatory and cultural settings (Christensen et 
al., 2013; Veith and Werner, 2014). Price data are collected from Datastream and accounting data 
from Amadeus. Data availability for our main variables of interest (P, BVPS, and EPS, and the 
respective first lags) during the sample period 2003-2013 results in 2,888 companies selected.  
3.2 Estimating the PRM 
We begin our analysis by investigating the first-order autocorrelation coefficient for the main 
variables of interest. Table 2 reports the results of this simple analysis for the whole sample and for 17 
sub-samples, one for each country. Consistent with previous literature, we use as dependent variable 
P, the stock price as at six months after fiscal year-end (Lang et al., 2003; Lang et al., 2006; Barth et 
al., 2008). To make our analysis more comparable to that by Barth et al. (2008), we also regress P on 
country and industry fixed-effects,
17
 and consider the residuals of this regression, P*, in our analysis. 
The results show a strong degree of first-order autocorrelation: for the whole sample and all of the 
country sub-samples there is a significant first-order autocorrelation coefficient. Regressing P on 
country and industry fixed-effects does not reduce the magnitude of first-order autocorrelation. 
                                                             
16 Note that both (10) and (11) reduce the possibility that a dynamic model is necessary, and eliminate the 
possibility of non-stationarity if Pit is an autoregressive process integrated of order one, or I(1). 
17 To obtain the industry fixed-effects, we consider the primary 2-digit SIC code. 
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Moreover, in many cases the coefficient is close to one, suggesting that some of the variables may be 
close to non-stationarity. For this reason, the GMM-SYS model appears more appropriate that the 
WG and even the GMM-DIF model.  
     [Insert Table 2 Here] 
In Table 3 we investigate whether there is correlation between the lag of P and P* and the 
explanatory variables of the PRM: BVPS and EPS. The results reported show that, apart from very 
few instances, there is a positive and significant correlation between the lag of stock price and the 
explanatory variables in the PRM. In many cases, the correlation coefficient is larger than 0.6. 
Therefore, omitting the lag of the stock price from the analysis is likely to induce significant OVB in 
the analysis.  
     [Insert Table 3 Here]  
In Table 4 we report the results for three different specifications for the PRM:  
  Pooled OLS regression with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered on the 
firm level based on model (6); 
  WG regression with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered on the firm level 
based on model (6); 
  WG regression with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered on the firm level 
based on model (7); 
The results clearly suggest that the type of specification chosen has a strong impact on inferences. 
The most common specification in empirical accounting studies, the first specification, suggests that 
there is no correlation between P or P* and the explanatory variables BVPS and EPS. On the other 
hand, for the WG models the coefficient on BVPS is positive and significant. However, including the 
lag of stock price as explanatory variable results in a considerable reduction of the magnitude of the 
coefficient on BVPS (around 0.7 and 0.8). The coefficient on the lag of stock price is positive and 
significant, and its magnitude (around 0.8-0.9) is in line with the results reported in Table 3. These 
results clearly point towards what we expected: there is a serious OVB problem in PRM that omit the 
lag of stock price on the right-hand side of the regression. 
    [Insert Table 4 Here] 
An additional issue is whether firm fixed-effects should be included in the regressions because of 
the presence of firm-specific time-invariant components in the error term correlated with one or more 
of the explanatory variables, that is, Cov(ηi, xit) ≠ 0. If this is the case, one should employ a WG 
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regression to avoid inconsistency of the coefficient estimates (or equivalently, an LSDV model). 
Conversely, if Cov(ηi, xit) = 0, a RE regression would result in higher efficiency, and should thus be 
preferred. Typically, researchers employ a Hausman test to decide between a WG or a RE regression, 
where the null hypothesis is Cov(ηi, xit) = 0, and rejection of this hypothesis leads to inconsistency of 
the RE estimates. In Table 5 we report the P-value for Hausman tests using model (6). In all instances 
except for Luxembourg, for which the number of observations is negligible, the Hausman test 
suggests that the RE estimates will be inconsistent because of the presence of firm fixed-effects.  
    [Insert Table 5 Here] 
In Section 4, we resort to a simulation exercise to better pinpoint the effects of omitting the lag of 
the stock price in the PRM. Moreover, we examine the dynamic panel bias when employed WG 
regressions instead of the GMM-SYS method. 
4. Monte Carlo simulations 
4.1 Simulating PRM variables 
In this section we use simulated data to explore the impact of neglecting the autoregressive nature 
of P, BVPS and EPS. Unlike Barth and Clinch (2009), who base their simulations on a modified 
version of the LIM, we calibrate our simulations on the basis of the statistical properties of the sample 
reported in Section 3. 
First, we generate a dataset with 2,000 fictitious firms and ten fictitious periods: i = 1, 2, …, 2000 
and t = 1, 2, …, 10. Therefore, our dataset contains 20,000 observations. However, in the regressions 
we lose one period because of the need to include the first lag of P, which results in 18,000 
observations for each regression. Then, we simulate the data for P, BVPS, and EPS. The Monte Carlo 
simulations are based on the following six Data Generating Processes (DGP): 
Simulations a):
18
  
i) 
Pit  = 0.8Pit–1  + u1,it BVPSit  = 0.8BVPSit–1 + u2,it EPSit  = 0.8EPSit–1 + u3,it 
                                                             
18 Clearly, in the long term, earnings are positively correlated with book value of equity. In these simulations, 
however, we are only interested in the econometric effect of neglecting the autoregressive nature of these 
variables, and in particular of Pit, rather than the theoretical model underlying the DGP of all three variables. 
Independence between BVPSit and EPSit has the additional benefit of avoiding multicollinearity, and therefore 
allows a more straightforward interpretation of the results. Moreover, as long as the clean surplus relation 
maintains, any change in earnings can be offset by a change in dividends and share repurchases (or offerings). 
For this reason, an increase (decrease) in EPSit needs not lead to an increase (decrease) in BVPSit, at least in the 
short term. 
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ii) 
Pit  = 0.9Pit–1 + u4,it  BVPSit  = 0.9BVPSit–1 + u5,it EPSit  = 0.9EPSit–1 + u6,it 
Simulations b):  
i) 
Pit  = 0.8Pit–1 + 0.4BVPSit  + u7,it  BVPSit  = 0.8BVPSit–1 + u8,it  EPSit  = 0.8EPSit–1 + u9,it 
ii) 
Pit  = 0.9Pit–1 + 0.4BVPSit  + u10,it   BVPSit  = 0.9BVPSit–1 + u11,it  EPSit  = 0.9EPSit–1 + u12,it 
Simulations c):  
i) 
Pit  = 0.8Pit–1  + 0.4BVPSit  + 0.2EPSit + u13,it   
BVPSit  = 0.8BVPSit–1 + u14,it   EPSit  = 0.8EPSit–1 + u15,it 
ii) 
Pit  = 0.9Pit–1 + 0.4BVPSit  + 0.2EPSit + u16,it   
BVPSit  = 0.9BVPSit–1 + u17,it   EPSit  = 0.9EPSit–1 + u18,it 
Where the error terms, u, are standard normal variables with mean zero and variance one. As can 
be seen from the formulas above, for a) P is unrelated to either BVPS or EPS, for b) P is correlated 
with BVPS (with coefficient 0.4), and for c) P is correlated with both BVPS (with coefficient 0.3) and 
EPS (with coefficient 0.2). For each simulation, we estimate (6) using both a pooled OLS and a WG 
regression, and we estimate (7) using both a WG and a GMM-SYS regression. Therefore, as it is 
common in the literature, we do not estimate the equations for BVPS and EPS, but only the one for 
P.
19
  
As a preliminary analysis, we examine the average correlation coefficient between the lag of P 
(Plag) and the explanatory variables for b) and c). For b.i), the average correlation coefficient 
between Plag and BVPS is 0.457, with a minimum of 0.427 and a maximum of 0.487. For b.ii) these 
values are: 0.564, 0.538, and 0.591. For c.i), the average correlation between Plag and BVPS is 0.418 
(minimum 0.384 and maximum 0.448), and the average correlation between Plag and BVPS is 0.209 
                                                             
19 For an application of simultaneous equations models to the price-earnings relation, see Beaver et al. (1997). 
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(0.156, and 0.259). For c.ii) these values are: 0.512 (0.475, and 0.541); and 0.256 (0.198, and 0.307). 
Therefore, the average correlation rate between Plag and the explanatory variables is substantial, and 
is likely to result in OVB. Also, note that these correlations are on average lower than what reported 
in section 3 for a sample of European firms. Therefore, in actual datasets, one could expect an even 
stronger OVB than the one we will report shortly below. 
4.2 Results for the Monte Carlo simulations: PRM 
Table 6 reports the results for the Monte Carlo simulations. Panel A reports the results for model 
(6), using an OLS regression and a WG regression. For both types of regression we employ 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered on the firm level. Panel B reports the results for 
model (7), using a WG regression and a GMM-SYS regression, using in both cases 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered on the firm level, and with the Windmeijer’s finite-
sample correction for the latter.  
The results in Panel A of Table 6 confirm that for cases a.i) and a.ii), for which there is no 
correlation between Pit–1 and the explanatory variables, omitting Pit–1 does not have any impact on the 
estimation of the coefficients on BVPSit  and EPSit, regardless of the estimation method employed 
(OLS or WG). However, when there is correlation between Pit–1 and the other explanatory variables, 
the average bias in the coefficients on BVPSit and EPSit is substantial, and it is stronger for the OLS 
model than for the WG model. For instance, for case b.i), the average bias for BVPSit is 0.5051 for the 
OLS model and 0.0985 for the WG model. The size of the bias increases as the autocorrelation 
coefficient for Pit increases: for b.ii) the average bias for BVPSit is 0.7995 for the OLS model and 
0.2076 for the WG model. The coefficients on EPSit for these cases are still virtually unbiased, 
because for these simulations there is no correlation between Pit–1 and EPSit in the DGP. For cases c.i) 
and c.ii), on the other hand, the DGP imply a significant correlation between Pit–1 and both BVPSit and 
EPSit. As a result, the coefficients on both BVPSit and EPSit are biased, and the bias is larger for the 
OLS model than for the WG model, and increase when the autocorrelation coefficient for Pit increases 
from 0.8 to 0.9. 
The results reported in Panel B of Table 6 show that if Pit–1 is included, the coefficient on Pit–1 is 
biased downwards when using a WG model, and unbiased when using a GMM-SYS model. However, 
the coefficients on the other explanatory variables are still substantially unbiased for cases a.i) and 
a.ii). For cases b.i), b.ii), c.i), and c.ii), there is some bias even in the coefficients on BVPSit and EPSit 
when the WG model is employed, but the size of the bias is negligible, and much lower than for the 
corresponding cases when Pit–1 is omitted. For instance, for case b.ii), the average bias for the WG 
model was 0.2076 in Panel A, but drops to 0.0299 in Panel B. Therefore, even if one does not want to 
employ dynamic panel data models, including Pit–1 in the regressions still reduces OVB considerably.  
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Finally, the results reported in both Panel A and B suggest that choosing the wrong specification 
may lead to a slightly over-sized or under-sized test. For instance, for Panel A, case a.i), the tests 
reject the null hypothesis of a coefficient on BVPSit  indistinguishable from zero in 8% of the cases for 
the OLS model for a significance level of 5%, meaning that the test is slightly over-sized, while for 
EPSit the rejection rate is 4% (slightly under-sized). However, the impact on rejection rates is not as 
strong as that on the average bias of the coefficients.  
    [Insert Table 6 Here] 
To clarify the impact of autocorrelation on the average bias in the coefficient of variables 
correlated with stock price, we plot in Figure 3 the average bias in the coefficient on BVPS (on the 
vertical axis) as a function of the autocorrelation coefficient on P and BVPS, ρ (on the horizontal 
axis), for three different cases: 
 When there is no correlation between P and BVPS; 
 When the coefficient on BVPS is 0.2; 
 When the coefficient on BVPS is 0.4. 
The values considered for the autocorrelation coefficient are: ρ  = 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, and 0.9. The 
average bias is calculated using 100 replications. Consistent with the results reported in Table 6, the 
average bias is virtually zero when there is no correlation between P and BVPS. When the coefficient 
on BVPS is 0.2 or 0.4, the average bias increases as the autocorrelation coefficient increases. For the 
same value of the autocorrelation coefficient, ρ, the average bias is larger when the coefficient on 
BVPS is 0.4 than when the coefficient on BVPS is 0.2.  
    [Insert Figure 3 Here] 
4.3 Results for the Monte Carlo simulations: Alternative specifications 
Table 7, Panel A reports the results for the Monte Carlo simulations for the RRM (model (10)) 
based for DGP a) and b) as described in section 4.1.
20
 We have estimated model (10), using an OLS 
regression and a WG regression. For both types of regression we employ heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors clustered on the firm level. For DGP a) there should be no relation between market 
                                                             
20 We deliberately avoid discussing the results for DGP c) for simplicity: for these cases the true coefficients on 
DEPS and ΔDEPS are different from zero and the high correlation between these two explanatory variables 
complicates the interpretation of the results.  
Rearranging b.i), we obtain: 
111
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Rearranging a.i) leads to a similar equation but with a zero coefficient even on BVPSit/Pit–1. 
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variables and accounting data, and therefore the coefficients should all be zero.
21
 This is because stock 
price depends only on its own lag for DGP a). For DGP b), stock price should depend only on BVPS, 
not on EPS or changes on EPS. Therefore, the results shown in the table focus on the rejection rates 
for cases for which the null hypothesis is true. These rejection rates are much higher (over 40%) than 
the theoretical ones (5%). To further examine the impact of deflating by the lag of price, in Table 7, 
Panel B we repeat the simulations after multiplying all variables in model (10) by Pit–1. The results 
show that the rejection rates drop dramatically to values very close to the theoretical ones (5%).  It is 
important to remark that this over-rejection problem does not depend on scale effects due to, for 
example, different firm size. Therefore, adjustments suggested by previous literature based on 
including scale proxies as independent variables (Barth and Kallapur, 1996) would not address this 
issue. 
Table 8 reports the results for the Monte Carlo simulations for the PRM deflated by the lag of 
stock price (model (11)), based on DGP a), b), and c) described in section 4.1. Similar to the results 
reported in Table 7, the average bias is not substantial, but the rejection rates when the null hypothesis 
is true are much higher than the theoretical ones, while the rejection rates for the cases for which the 
null hypothesis is false are well below 100%. 
    [Insert Tables 7 and 8 Here] 
These findings constitute, to the best of our knowledge, the first evidence that adjustments to the 
PRM implemented in empirical studies to eliminate the impact of scale effects on the validity of 
rejection rates may in fact lead to over- or under-rejection of the null hypothesis. In other words, the 
cure may be no better than the disease, and in certain cases may actually be the very cause of the 
disease. 
5. Conclusions 
In this study, we have critically evaluated the effects of autocorrelation in the main variables of 
price level regressions employed in accounting empirical research. We have shown that studies that 
do not allow for autocorrelation in stock price, book value per share, and earnings per share can 
caused serious bias in the coefficients of the PRM, a widely-employed specification in market-based 
accounting research. This bias is strongest for regressions that do not consider firm effects in the 
regressions. However, adding firm fixed-effects to the specifications does not eliminate the bias.  
We have further demonstrated that augmenting the PRM by adding the lag of stock price can 
reduce the bias. However, to correctly estimate the autocorrelation coefficient, dynamic panel data 
                                                             
21 By using the DGP a) and b), we calculate RETit considering DPSit = 0. Therefore, we are assuming that all 
firms are non-dividend payers. This is consistent with the simulations in Barth and Clinch (2009). 
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models must be employed. On the other hand, alternative specifications commonly employed in the 
empirical accounting literature (such as returns regressions) can lead to further econometric problems: 
for example, models that use the lag of stock price as a deflator may tend to reject of the null 
hypothesis of no correlation between market data and accounting data too often when the null 
hypothesis is true. These results support recent literature cautioning against the use of ratios in applied 
studies using panel data for variables that may have different stochastic properties (Barghava, 2010). 
The importance of our findings extends beyond the scope of market-based accounting studies. 
Any regression that employs book values of equity or earnings (even if adjusted on a per-share basis) 
as dependent variable is likely to suffer from omitted variable bias if the regression specification does 
not allow for the effect of the lags of the dependent variable. Further research is envisaged to assess 
the impact of omitting autocorrelation of the dependent variable in market-based accounting studies 
using extended version of the LIM to assess the value relevance of specific accounting items in the 
financial statements.  
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Table 1: Studies on value relevance that employ the PRM (and related modifications). 
Paper Topic 
Sample composition and 
period 
Main results 
Aly and Hwang (2000) Value relevance of and 
country-specific factors. 
6,410 firms-year 
observations from 
different countries 
Period: 1986-1995 
Value relevance is affected by country-specific factors such as: the type of 
financial system (bank-oriented vis-à-vis market-oriented), the relevance of 
private-sector bodies in the standard-setting process, the type of accounting 
practices (Continental model vis-à-vis British-American model); the relevance of 
tax rules on financial accounting measurements; and the expenditure on auditing 
services. 
Hung and 
Subramanyam (2007) 
Value Relevance of IAS 
for a sample of German 
firms. 
 
80 German listed 
companies 
Period: 1998-2002 
The adjustment to equity book value is incrementally value relevant under IAS, but 
the aggregate net income adjustment is not. 
Barth et al. (2008) Adoption of IAS and 
accounting quality 
(earnings management, 
timely loss recognition  
and value relevance) 
327 Listed companies 
from different countries. 
Period: 1994-2003 
Better value relevance for companies that apply IAS. 
 
 
Gjerde et al. (2008) Value relevance of IFRS 
and of Norwegian GAAP. 
145 Norway listed 
companies 
Period: 2004-2005 
Value-relevance of key IFRS accounting figures not superior to the corresponding 
local GAAP accounting figures, when they are evaluated unconditionally and 
conservatively as two independent samples. 
 
Morais and Curto (2009) 
 
Value relevance in 
European-listed 
companies after the 
mandatory application of 
IAS/IFRS. 
6,977 European-listed 
companies 
Period: 2000-2005 
  
Increasing value relevance of accounting data with the mandatory adoption of 
IAS/IFRS. Value relevance of accounting information under IAS/IFRS is different 
between countries. 
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Table 1 continued 
Aharony et al (2010) 
  
Value relevance of 
accounting numbers in  
Europe after the 
mandatory adoption of the 
IFRS. 
 
2,298 European-listed 
companies 
Period: 2004-2005 
 
Increasing value relevance for investors in equity securities in the EU of the three 
accounting numbers (goodwill, R&R expenses, and asset revaluation) with the 
adoption of the IFRS 
Devalle et al. (2010) 
 
Value relevance of 
accounting information in  
Europe after the 
mandatory adoption of the 
IFRS 
3,721 European-listed 
companies 
Period: 2002-2007 
Improvement in value relevance in the post IFRS period, with heterogeneous 
effects for the book value per share and the earnings per share. 
Horton and Serafeim 
(2010) 
 
Value-relevance of 
information contained in 
IFRS reconciliation 
adjustments with UK 
GAAP. 
297 UK listed companies 
Period: 2002-2007 
Coefficient on the aggregate net income adjustment is significantly positive. Net 
income adjustments are value relevant. 
Agostino et al. (2011) Value relevance of 
accounting information in 
the European banking 
industry before and after 
the adoption of IFRS  
221 European listed banks 
Period: 2000-2006 
Increasing value relevance of earnings after compulsory adoption of IFRS.  
 
Barth et al. (2012) Comparability of  value 
relevance between IFRS 
and U.S. GAAP. 
3,400 Listed companies 
from different countries 
Period: 1995-2006 
IFRS lead to higher value relevance comparability with U.S. GAAP than non-U.S. 
national GAAP. 
Barth et al. (2014) Value relevance of 
reconciliation adjustments 
for net income and book 
value adjustments to 
IFRS. 
1,201 European-listed 
companies 
Period: 2005 
The adjustments to net income resulting from mandatory adoption of IFRS in 
Europe in 2005 are value relevant. The net income adjustment relating to IAS 39 is 
value relevant for financial firms but not for non-financial firms. 
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Table 2: First-order autocorrelation coefficients for P, P*, BVPS, and EPS for a sample of European firms. 
 
P P* BVPS EPS 
 
P P* BVPS EPS 
All 
countries 
0.9820 0.9841 0.9818 0.9148 
  
 
  
  
 
  
Italy 0.8797 0.9779 0.9845 0.8435 
Austria 0.9691 0.9706 0.9962 0.9148 Lux.burg 0.8253 0.9167 0.4865 0.6805 
Belgium 0.9838 0.9828 0.9961 0.6402 Neth.nds 0.9624 0.9265 0.9830 0.9970 
Denmark 0.9649 0.9646 0.9981 0.8069 Norway 0.9544 0.9767 0.9805 0.7897 
Finland 0.9509 0.9822 0.9679 0.9575 Portugal 0.8758 0.9844 0.9903 0.8535 
France  0.9633 0.9618 0.9113 0.9728 Spain 0.9054 0.9503 0.9665 0.9053 
Germany 0.9765 0.9674 0.9975 0.6019 Sweden 0.8837 0.8862 0.8907 0.5874 
Greece 0.9362 0.9946 0.9933 0.9189 Switz.nd 0.9875 0.9875 0.9838 0.9594 
Ireland 0.8983 0.9917 0.9609 0.7537 UK 0.7674 0.9952 0.9773 0.7770 
Note: For all cases the autocorrelation is significant at the 5% level.  
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Table 3: Correlation between first lag of stock price (P and P*) and BVPS, EPS for a sample of European firms. 
 
BVPS EPS BVPS EPS 
 
BVPS EPS BVPS EPS 
 Lag of P Lag of P*  Lag of P Lag of P* 
All 
countries 
0.5892 0.6852 0.5608 0.6512 
  
 
  
 
    Italy 0.4779 0.4183 0.2487 0.2381 
Austria 0.8236 0.6076 0.8085 0.6060 Lux.burg 0.0373
+ 
-0.0487
+
 -0.0857
+
 -0.1155
+
 
Belgium 0.9558 0.8234 0.9408 0.7972 Neth.nds 0.9669 0.9717 0.2919 0.5089 
Denmark 0.9116 0.9122 0.8985 0.8987 Norway 0.9524 0.6505 0.6331 0.4327 
Finland 0.9549 0.9239 0.5112 0.5218 Portugal 0.5316 0.5580 -0.0865
+ 
-0.1547 
France  0.7794 0.5147 0.7774 0.5134 Spain 0.6371 0.2666 0.4475 0.2216 
Germany 0.2271 0.1869 0.1654 0.1514 Sweden 0.7272 0.8920 0.7150 0.8792 
Greece 0.8628 0.8617 0.1513 0.1505 Switz.nd 0.9542 0.9671 0.9538 0.9670 
Ireland 0.7201 0.8148 0.1309
+ 
0.2075 UK 07775 0.7895 0.1689 0.1328 
Note: For all cases except those denoted by “+” the correlation is significant at the 5% level.  
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Table 4. PRM Regressions using a sample of European firms. 
Dep. var: P OLS WG WG Dep. var: P* OLS WG WG 
        
Lag of P –   – 0.7775*** Lag of P* –   – 0.8688*** 
   (0.1070)    (0.0709) 
BVPS -0.1511 1.5258*** 0.8101*** BVPS -0.1592 1.5409*** 0.7519*** 
 (0.5847) (0.4273) (0.2480)  (0.5867) (0.4378) (0.2572) 
EPS 10.5345* 1.4700 -0.0260 EPS 10.1024 1.4535 -0.3312 
 (6.3421) (1.1748) (0.5357)  (7.5106) (1.1751) (0.4425) 
Constant 20.2931 -15.9407 -21.3678** Constant -34.1626 -74.0945*** -29.5740** 
 (21.7915) (25.9035) (10.5356)  (21.0808) (25.7110) (11.4820) 
        
Observations 14,943 14,943 14,943 Observations 14,908 14,908 14,908 
Number of firms 2,814 2,814 2,814 Number of firms 2,801 2,801 2,801 
Notes: *** Denotes significance at the 1% level. ** Denotes significance at the 5% level. * Denotes significance at the 10% level. 
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Table 5. PRM regressions: P-values for Hausman test for WG and RE for a sample of 
European firms. Dependent variables: P and P*. 
 
P P* 
 
P P* 
All 
countries 
0.0000 0.0000 
  
 
 
  Italy 0.0000 0.0000 
Austria 0.0057 0.0054 Lux.burg 0.3091 0.3099 
Belgium 0.0000 0.0000 Neth.nds 0.0000 0.0000 
Denmark 0.0000 0.0000 Norway 0.0000 0.0000 
Finland 0.0000 0.0000 Portugal 0.0002 0.0000 
France  0.0000 0.0000 Spain 0.0000 0.0000 
Germany 0.0000 0.0000 Sweden 0.0000 0.0000 
Greece 0.0000 0.0000 Switz.nd 0.0000 0.0000 
Ireland 0.0000 0.0000 UK 0.0000 0.0000 
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Table 6. Monte Carlo simulations results for DGP a), b), and c) based on 500 replications using simulated data for 2,000 firms and 10 years. 
Panel A: Estimation of model (6) using a pooled OLS regression and a WG regression.  
Dep. var.: Pit   OLS  WG  
DGP Variable True coefficient Average bias Rejection rate (α=5%) Average bias Rejection rate 
(α=5%) 
a.i)  Pit-1 0.8 - - - - 
 
BVPSit 0.0 0.0002 8.00% -0.0006 5.80% 
 
EPSit 0.0 0.0003 4.80% 0.0002 5.00% 
a.ii)  Pit-1 0.9 - - - - 
 
BVPSit 0.0 0.0004 8.00% -0.0004 6.40% 
 
EPSit 0.0 0.0003 4.00% 0.0002 5.20% 
b.i)  Pit-1 0.8 - - - - 
 
BVPSit 0.4 0.5051 100% 0.0985 100% 
 
EPSit 0.0 -0.0006 5.00% 0.0003 7.80% 
b.ii)  Pit-1 0.9 - - - - 
 
BVPSit 0.4 0.7995 100% 0.2076 100% 
 
EPSit 0.0 -0.0009 5.80% 0.0002 6.60% 
c.i)  Pit-1 0.8 - - - - 
 
BVPSit 0.4 0.5049 100% 0.0992 100% 
 
EPSit 0.2 0.2525 100% 0.0498 100% 
c.ii)  Pit-1 0.9 - - - - 
 
BVPSit 0.4 0.7989 100% 0.2088 100% 
 
EPSit 0.2 0.3996 100% 0.1041 100% 
Notes: For consistency between model (6) and (7), we exclude observations for which the lag of P is missing for model (6). Therefore, for 
each regression we lose 2,000 observations, and the total number of observations is 18,000 (20,000 – 2,000). Both the OLS and the WG 
regressions employ heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered on the firm level. Rejection rates are based on the proportion of the 500 
replications for which the t-statistic is larger than |1.96|. 
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Table 6. Monte Carlo simulations results for DGP a), b), and c) based on 500 replications using simulated data for 2,000 firms and 10 years. 
Panel B: Estimation of model (7) using a WG regression and a GMM-SYS regression.  
Dep. var.: Pit   WG  GMM-SYS  
DGP Variable True coefficient Average bias Rejection rate (α=5%) Average bias Rejection rate (α=5%) 
a.i)  Pit-1 0.8 -0.2717 100% 0.0000 100% 
 
BVPSit 0.0 -0.0006 7.20% -0.0001 5.40% 
 
EPSit 0.0 0.0004 6.40% 0.0005 5.80% 
a.ii)  Pit-1 0.9 -0.3024 100% 0.0000 100% 
 
BVPSit 0.0 -0.0005 7.00% -0.0001 4.80% 
 
EPSit 0.0 0.0004 6.20% 0.0004 6.40% 
b.i)  Pit-1 0.8 -0.1643 100% 0.0005 100% 
 
BVPSit 0.4 0.0205 100% -0.0008 100% 
 
EPSit 0.0 0.0002 4.00% -0.0003 5.80% 
b.ii)  Pit-1 0.9 -0.1279 100% 0.0003 100% 
 
BVPSit 0.4 0.0299 100% -0.0007 100% 
 
EPSit 0.0 0.0002 4.00% -0.0002 5.80% 
c.i)  Pit-1 0.8 -0.1443 100% 0.0004 100% 
 
BVPSit 0.4 0.0177 100% -0.0014 100% 
 
EPSit 0.2 0.0092 100% -0.0004 100% 
c.ii)  Pit-1 0.9 -0.1107 100% 0.0003 100% 
 
BVPSit 0.4 0.0255 100% -0.0012 100% 
 
EPSit 0.2 0.0129 100% -0.0004 100% 
Notes: For consistency between model (6) and (7), we exclude observations for which the lag of P is missing for model (6). Therefore, for 
each regression we lose 2,000 observations, and the total number of observations is 18,000 (20,000 – 2,000). The WG regressions employ 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered on the firm level, and the GMM-SYS regressions employ Windmeijer’s finite-sample 
correction. Rejection rates are based on the proportion of the 500 replications for which the t-statistic is larger than |1.96|. 
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Table 7. RRM: Monte Carlo simulations results for OLS and WG regressions. 
Panel A: Estimation of model (10). 
Dep. var.: RETit   OLS  WG  
DGP Variable True coefficient Average bias Rejection rate (α=5%) Average bias Rejection rate (α=5%) 
a.i) DEPSit 0.0 0.0189 47.40% 0.0191 47.40% 
 
ΔDEPSit 0.0 -0.0130 48.20% -0.0132 48.20% 
a.ii) DEPSit 0.0 0.0265 40.40% 0.0266 40.20% 
 
ΔDEPSit 0.0 -0.0597 45.80% -0.0596 46.20% 
b.i) DEPSit 0.0 0.0255 46.00% 0.0254 46.00% 
 
ΔDEPSit 0.0 -0.0256 46.40% -0.0254 46.40% 
b.ii) DEPSit 0.0 0.0096 48.60% 0.0095 48.40% 
 
ΔDEPSit 0.0 0.0010 44.60% 0.0010 44.60% 
Panel B: Estimation of model (10) after multiplying RET, DEPS, and ΔDEPS by Pit–1. 
Dep. var.: ΔPit (Pit – Pit–1)  OLS  WG  
DGP Variable True coefficient Average bias Rejection rate (α=5%) Average bias Rejection rate (α=5%) 
a.i) EPSit 0.0 0.0004 5.60% 0.0007 5.20% 
 
ΔEPSit 0.0 0.0000 5.20% -0.0001 4.80% 
a.ii) EPSit 0.0 0.0003 3.40% 0.0006 5.40% 
 
ΔEPSit 0.0 0.0001 5.40% -0.0001 4.80% 
b.i) EPSit 0.0 0.0001 7.40% 0.0003 4.40% 
 
ΔEPSit 0.0 -0.0002 6.00% -0.0004 5.80% 
b.ii) EPSit 0.0 0.0001 6.40% 0.0004 4.60% 
 
ΔEPSit 0.0 -0.0002 5.60% -0.0004 6.40% 
Notes: We assume DGP a) and b) and employ 500 replications using simulated data for 2,000 firms and 10 years. Both the OLS and the WG 
regressions use heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered on the firm level. DEPSit = EPSit/Pit–1 and ΔDEPSit = ΔEPSit/Pit–1.  Rejection rates 
are based on the proportion of the 500 replications for which the t-statistic is larger than |1.96|. 
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Table 8. PRM deflated: Monte Carlo simulations results. Estimation of model (11) using a pooled OLS regression and a WG regression.  
Dep. var.: Pit / Pit–1   OLS  WG  
DGP Variable True coefficient Average bias Rejection rate (α=5%) Average bias Rejection rate (α=5%) 
a.i) DBVPSit 0.0 0.0389 43.00% 0.0388 43.20% 
 
DEPSit 0.0 -0.0126 47.40% -0.0128 47.60% 
a.ii) DBVPSit 0.0 0.0124 47.20% 0.0123 47.20% 
 
DEPSit 0.0 0.0085 42.40% 0.0085 42.40% 
b.i) DBVPSit 0.4 -0.0285 67.60% -0.0286 67.60% 
 
DEPSit 0.0 0.0129 48.60% 0.0131 48.40% 
b.ii) DBVPSit 0.4 -0.0362 65.60% -0.0362 65.60% 
 
DEPSit 0.0 0.0008 45.20% 0.0007 45.20% 
c.i) DBVPSit 0.4 -0.0395 64.40% -0.0396 64.40% 
 
DEPSit 0.2 -0.0765 51.20% -0.0767 51.40% 
c.ii) DBVPSit 0.4 0.0017 69.60% 0.0018 69.60% 
 
DEPSit 0.2 0.0241 54.00% 0.0240 54.20% 
Notes: Similar to Table 6, we assume DGP a), b), and c) and employ 500 replications using simulated data for 2,000 firms and 10 years. Both 
the OLS and the WG regressions use heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered on the firm level. DBVPSit = BVPSit/Pit–1 and DEPSit = 
EPSit/Pit–1. Rejection rates are based on the proportion of the 500 replications for which the t-statistic is larger than |1.96|. 
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Figure 1. Autocorrelation coefficients in book value of equity and market value of equity as a 
function of ω (moderation period). 
 
Note: the starting value for interest rates is 3%.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ω 
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Figure 2. Autocorrelation coefficients in book value of equity and market value of equity as a 
function of ω (growth period). 
 
Note: the starting value for interest rates is 12%.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ω 
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Figure 3. Autocorrelation and bias of the coefficients. 
 
Note: the average bias is calculated on the basis of 2,000 fictitious firms and 10 years. We 
simulate 100 series for P and BVPS. The DGP for P and BVPS is as follows: 
 Pit = ρ Pit–1 + uit    and  BVPSit = ρ BVPSit–1 + uit 
 Pit = ρ Pit–1 + 0.2 BVPSit  + uit  and  BVPSit = ρ BVPSit–1 + uit 
 Pit = ρ Pit–1 + 0.4 BVPSit  + uit  and  BVPSit = ρ BVPSit–1 + uit 
The autocorrelation coefficient, ρ, takes on the following values: 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, and 0.9. 
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Appendix 
A1. Generating book value of equity and market value of equity using the Ohlson model 
We simulate data for 500 fictitious firms and 40 years of data. We set the starting value for the book 
value of equity at 100. The starting value for R = (1 + r) is 1.03 for the moderation period (Figure 1) 
and 1.12 for the growth period (Figure 2). For the subsequent periods, R follows a random walk with 
normally distributed and independent innovations with mean zero and standard deviation equal to 
0.005. The abnormal earnings follow an AR(1) process according to equation (3), with γ = 0.2 and ω 
= 0.01, 0.02,…,1. The two error terms are generated assuming: t,1 ~ N(0, 
2
1 ) and t,2 ~ N(0, 
2
2 ), 
with tt ,2,1   and
2
2
2
1    = 102.2
2
R
-40
 (Barth and Clinch, 2009). Dividends are assumed to be 
zero. Following Ohlson (1995), we also assume m = 0. 
 
A2. Dynamic panel models 
The equations in first-differences can be written as: 
ΔPit = ρΔPit–1 + bΔBVPSit + cΔEPSit + Δφit      (A1) 
The matrix of instruments for ΔPit–1 is constructed for each time period starting from Pit–2, and 
substituting missing values with zeros:  





















123
12
1
000
0000
00000
000000
iii
ii
i
PPP
PP
P
      (A2) 
The instruments for the levels equation employ only one lag for each time period and instrumental 
variable because using more lags would be redundant: 
























4
3
2
00
00
00
000
i
i
i
P
P
P
        (A3) 
Therefore, the instruments for the differenced and levels equations are, respectively:
22
 
                                                             
22 Several problems may arise when employing the GMM-DIF or GMM-SYS in actual datasets. First, for 
unbalanced panels, first-differencing exacerbates the problem of missing observations. However, this problem 
can be addressed using orthogonal deviations (Arellano and Bover, 1995), an option available for “xtabond2”. A 
second issue arises with GMM-SYS, for which the number of instruments is quartic in T. The large number of 
instruments can weaken the validity of the test for over-identifying restrictions (that is, the Hansen test in case of 
heteroskedastic errors), leading to a very large p-value. This problem, commonly referred to as “instruments 
proliferation”, can be addressed via the “collapsing technique” (Roodman, 2009), also available as an option for 
“xtabond2”. 
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  0E  itlitP    for each t ≥ 3 and l ≥ 2      (A4) 
  0E 1   ititP   for each t ≥ 3       (A5) 
 
 
